Abstract:
As a result of international collaboration, countries worldwide opened their
procurement practices to foreign competition. However, with foreign
competition, governments are jeopardizing the achievement of national
economic, political, and social objectives through public procurement. Thus,
governments have implemented protectionism by stipulating in the procurement
laws that domestic tenderers should be granted preference when making
government-related acquisitions. Therefore, this study primarily evaluated
Tanzania’s domestic preference practice to determine the application of legal
provisions and the efficiencies achieved from making acquisitions through
domestic tenderers. The study used a doctrinal method, where the expositions of
the law were compared with actual practice. Data was collected from fourteen
procurement experts using in-depth interviews. The interviews were derived from
the Delphi research concepts, where interviews were conducted on a ‘rounds’
basis to establish the consensus of findings between procurement experts. The
study found inconsistencies when applying domestic preference, where procuring
entities did not state in tendering documents the application of domestic
preference while the procurement value fell within the range of domestic
preference application. Also, preference for special groups in procuring entity
jurisdictions was not included in procurement plans. Additionally, it was found
that domestic tenderers are faced with capital challenges that affect their ability
to effectively discharge procurement contracts by possessing sufficient
resources. The study recommends that procuring entities embrace domestic
preference to contribute to domestic economic growth and development by
correctly abiding by the provisions of the law when administering tendering
processes.
